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I. Observations
1. Revenue, expenditures, balances, and indebtedness
a. Steadily rising regional expenditures 
Janssens et al. (2008) studied the trend of the Brussels-Capital Region's (BCR’s) 
expenditures since 2001. It appears that the rate of growth of its expenditures was 
very high. The mean annual rate of growth for the period 2001-2008 is 4.4% in real 
terms. The growth of primary expenditures was even more marked: +4.8% per year,  
on average, in real terms. The fastest rates of growth were seen for public works 
and transport (+5.6%), transfers to the local authorities (+6.1%), and cabinets 
(+17%). 
The rapid rise of spending followed that of income, so that the balances to finance 
remained close to the break-even line. 
b. More independent regional revenues 
The Lambermont Reform led to a change in the Special Financing Law (SFL) that 
was important for the BCR: regional tax autonomy was increased, especially in the 
area of inheritance taxes, duties on gifts, the road tax on automobiles and vehicle 
registration fees, and registration fees on property transfers. The Region's own in-
come from tax revenues now accounts for 50% of its revenue [Van der Stichele and 
Verdonck, 2001]. 
Over the period 2002-2009, registration fees on property transfersaccount for about 
20.5% (58.4% of the revenues from taxes on real estate) of the Region's revenues 
and inheritance taxes 12.6% (respectively 35.3%) [Zimmer 2007]. The bulk of the 
BCR’s revenues from taxes on real estate is thus based on real estate transactions 
or inheritance, that is to say, flows, rather than on already registered property (a 
stock). These percentages are markedly lower in the other Regions.
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c.  Local expenditures financed by grants
The local (municipalities’) operating expenses and transfer expenditures to the wel-
fare offices (CPAS/OCMW), police zones, and hospitals are increasing noticeably in 
the long term. Moreover, revenues from the income tax is limp within the Region's 
borders, and this weighs much more heavily on the local finances than on those of 
the Region (where the fiscal equalization mechanism kicks in). 
The result is a basic characteristic of the municipalities’ financing, namely, the 
steady growth of grants, especially the regional ones, from which they benefit. The 
various funds and subsidies increased at the rate of 4.6% per annum over the pre-
vious legislative term (2000-2006; figures do not include the City of Brussels)1, with 
a spurt at the end of the period. The recent improvement in the local financial situa-
tion can be explained by the injection of close to 40 million euros of regional money 
(Cabinet Picqué, 2008).
d. Federal grants in favour of the Region or its municipalities open to criticism
The purpose of the federal-regional cooperation agreement “BELIRIS” is to provide 
federal budgetary intervention in infrastructure initiatives that promote Brussels’in-
ternational role and functions as a capital. The expected commitments appropria-
tions are of about 125 million euros per annum for 2009 and 2010, to be comple-
mented by at least €65 million a year”2 starting in 2009. When it comes to the de-
tails, we see that the commitment rate related to BELIRIS is extremely low. This 
agreement is managed by a Co-operation Committee that includes no fewer than 
eight ministers. The administration in charge of the work is a federal rather than a 
regional one. Moreover, the scope of the agreement is becoming more and more 
broad and fuzzy. 
The SFL provides for federal grants to the municipalities to compensate for the 
buildings benefiting from an exemption for real estate tax. In the Brussels-Capital 
Region, this compensation is paid directly into the regional budget. The compensa-
tion covers only 72% of the theoretical shortfall and a series of other shortfalls to be 
made up are not compensated [Van der Stichele, 2003].
The Brussels’ municipalities benefit from a variety of mechanisms, such as the Large 
Cities Policy ('politique des grandes villes'), grants for the City of Brussels, etc. The 
result is a multiplicity of financial transfers, less consistency between policies, and 
risks of pandering to political clienteles. 
e. Cultural Community Commissions with diverging budgetary positions 
The COCOF and VGC have opposite budgetary situations. The COCOF’s budget is 
in dire straits, due to the budgetary difficulties with which the French-speaking 
Community had to grapple. The transfers from the COCOF to the French-speaking 
Community continued to increased even after the Lambermont agreements pro-
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vided for an increase in the financing of the latter. The VGC’s position, on the con-
trary, is flourishing. It has relatively large amounts of financial means, thanks to the 
support of the Flemish Community, but also thanks to the financial transfers that are 
organised by the BCR.
2. Fiscal policies and other market instruments
a. An active regional tax policy but of limited magnitude
Verdonck (2009) shows that the three Regions have made an intensive use of their 
fiscal autonomy to achieve their regional policy objectives. The BCR, for its part, has 
a host of measures aimed at encouraging home ownership and fighting against 
urban exodus (e.g., reduced registration fees). It has reduced the real estate tax to 
support social housing and to encourage economic activity. In the environmental 
field, it has used market instruments (water prices, elimination of rubbish collection 
taxes, for example) quite actively. In contrast, the Region has taken no special 
measures in the areas of taxes on automobile and urban tolls.
Some Flemish tax measures triggered a response from Brussels aimed at prevent-
ing movements of the tax base (inheritance taxes and registration fees on property. 
It therefore appears that the risks of a race-to-the-bottom in tax rates exist, despite 
safeguards in the financing law, especially for measures concerning businesses and 
mobile tax bases.
b. A multitude of uncoordinated municipal tax policies
There are major differences in the tax structures between municipalities. Moreover, 
the evolutions in taxes are clearly differentiated, with a marked rise in real estate tax 
revenue that contrasts with income tax revenue that has declined over the years in 
both absolute and relative terms.
The municipalities’ reliance on taxation, which includes various taxes on business as 
well, is increasing quickly, with municipal taxes currently accounting for about 9% of 
their revenue (compared with 7% in 2000).
3. Intra- and extra-regional solidarity
a. Chronic under-financing of the Brussels-Capital Region and its constituent mu-
nicipalities
The financial burden borne by the BCR as a metropolis, capital of the European 
Union, and capital of Belgium and the Flemish and French-speaking Communities is 
to a large extent borne by the inhabitants of the nineteen municipalities making up 
the Region, whereas the benefits of these multiple functions are felt well beyond the 
Region's borders [Cattoir et al., 1999a]. In addition, BCR being a small Region, it 
bears higher per capita incompressible political and administrative structural costs 
than the other Belgian Regions . Brussels also suffers from various major budgetary 
shortfalls. The personal income tax is Regions collected at the place of residence, 
not at the place of work. This political choice is detrimental to Brussels, whereas it is 
advantageous for the two other regions.
The additional costs that Brussels bears plus the shortfalls with which it must cope 
were estimated at €490.5 million in 2003 [Van der Stichele, 2003]. Today, this figure 
is even higher, given various factors such as the increased road traffic in the BCR. 
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This figure is an unadjusted estimate that does not take account of possible existing 
partial compensation schemes.
b. Brussels’s solidarity with Wallonia and Flanders
There are many forms of inter-regional solidarity. The commission set up by the 
Flemish regional government to study the methodology used to analyse inter-
regional transfers handed in its report at the end of 2006 [Cattoir et al., 2006]. Ac-
cording to its findings, using the workplace criterion instead of the place of resi-
dence to distribute tax revenue from personal income tax would lead to major 
changes: the BCR would give €1.3 billion instead of receiving €1.4 billion [de Calla-
taÿ and Cattoir, 2007]. 
A recent study presenting a new estimate of inter-regional transfers in Belgium cal-
culated that the BCR transferred a total of €212 million (€211 per inhabitant) to the 
other Regions in 2005 [Dury et al., 2008]. 
c. Limited intra-Brussels financial solidarity within a narrow regional framework
Initiallyn a centralised Municipalities Fund had been set up to allow the redistribution 
of finances between rich and poor municipalities. Since the decentralization of this 
Fund, redistribution now takes place within each Region. Vaesen (2008) suggests 
that, mutatis mutandis, the redistribution in favour of the Flemish and Walloon Re-
gions’ urban centres, especially Antwerp and Liège, respectively, that is achieved by 
the Regions’ grants to the municipalities, results in markedly higher transfers to 
these cities, per resident, than those that are effected through the general grants to 
the municipalities of Brussels.
4. Governance and quality of public spending
a. A fragmented political landscape that generates governance problems 
Some important historical and cultural community-related developments have 
marked political structures, practices, and policies in Brussels [Vaesen, 2008]. The 
result is a complex and fragmented political and institutional system that thwarts the 
emergence of a consistent vision and set of actions for the Region's territory. Shift-
ing regional means to new priorities is a real problem for broad coalition govern-
ments such as those that have governed Brussels. Moreover, the risks of duplicat-
ing efforts or having local authorities step in for regional authorities are heightened. 
For example, there are some forty-one ministers or deputy mayors in charge of cul-
ture in the BCR and four public transport companies operate within Brussels’s bor-
ders. A general increase in efficiency in these areas thus seems possible.
One additional problem of governance that is linked to the foregoing concerns the 
politicisation and “communitarisation” of the Region's administration, which have 
been exacerbated by the existence of language quotas. The regional administration 
ends up promoting civil servants on the basis of political or language criteria, which 
is no guarantee of efficiency. The complex problem of language quotas, representa-
tion, and linguistic parity is linked to the broader matter of language use in Brussels’ 
institutions (city halls, hospitals, and so on). It adds an additional layer to the prob-
lem of the transfer of powers.
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II. Questions-issues
1. Revenue, expenditures, balances, and indebtedness
a. Regional spending linked to revenue?
The Region's revenues have risen over the past few years, but the parallel rise in 
expenditures has been such that no financial reserve could be constituted to cope 
with a possible backward swing of the financial pendulum.
b. More vulnerable and volatile regional revenue?
Whilst the increase in fiscal autonomy was favourable to the Region in a period 
marked by a property boom, the Regions now have to cope with the risks that are 
linked to today’s greater volatility of revenue. The relative position of taxes on real 
property in Brussels’ total revenue, along with their nature, induces risks of revenue 
instability. In particular, registration fees on property transfer for payment are highly 
sensitive to short-term economic developments.
c. Municipal finances permanently on an IV drip?
Unable to find enough revenues of their own to cover their rising expenditures, the 
municipalities of Brussels are bit by bit losing their autonomy, for the increasing re-
gional financial transfers to the municipal governments give the regional authorities a 
form of indirect control or influence over the local authorities. This situation is not 
that cut and dry, however, given the great differences that exist between municipali-
ties in this regard. The special purpose grants scheme helps primarily the poorest 
municipalities, whereas wealthy municipalities, such as Auderghem/Oudergem, can 
rely more on their own tax revenues, which they are free to assign as they see fit.
In practice, the financial efforts are thus more often made by another level of power, 
the Region. Systematic reliance on ad hoc increases in regional transfers to the Re-
gion's municipalities makes them less responsible and is not conducive to strict 
budget management. We see, however, that when they call upon the regional refi-
nancing fund, more direct regional monitoring of municipalities’ finances is carried 
out by the authority to which they are accountable.
d. Do the federal mechanisms in favour of Brussels and its municipalities need revi-
sing?
The federal financial assistance that is received is opaque when it comes to objec-
tives and inefficient when it comes to implementation. This increases some critics’ 
feelings that the BCR and its nineteen local governments waste this aid and it would 
be better to reduce it. For others, on the contrary, this bolsters the case for a com-
plete and definitive transfer of this aid’s management to the BCR (example: BE-
LIRIS).
e. Does the COCOF need refinancing?
In the absence of refinancing, it will be difficult to keep the services that the sectors 
financed by the COCOF provide at a satisfactory level in relation to their needs. This 
is a problem that the VGC does not have. The goal is not for these institutions, 
which have different powers, to reach similar sizes, but to enable them to provide 
the same quality of service, mutatis mutandis. 
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2. Fiscal policies and other market instruments 
a. Is the regional tax policy in a straitjacket?
The BCR’s room for manoeuvre when it comes to taxation is limited because of the 
Region's size and geographical location, as well as its difficult financial position.
There are problems of fairness and effectiveness in the area of the real estate tax. It 
should be recalled that two identical properties can be taxed in totally different ways 
in Brussels, since no (federal) real estate reassessment has been conducted since 
1980 (based on 1975 property values). The result is a growing gap between the 
taxes that are paid and real properties’ true values.
b. Municipal tax policies that lack a consistent and common vision?
The aim of taxation, besides collecting financial means, is to support policy meas-
ures through its carrot-and-stick effect. The diversity and absence of co-ordination 
of municipal taxes in the BCR also reflect a certain lack of a consistent political vi-
sion across the length and breadth of Brussels although such a vision is necessary, 
for amongst other things the Region needs to attract or simply to keep residents 
and businesses on its territory.
3. Intra- and extra-regional solidarity
a. Insufficient or unsatisfactory solidarity mechanisms?
Despite large implicit financial transfers between Brussels and Belgium’s other con-
stituent Regions, the financial conditions that accompanied the Regions’ creation 
are skewed, to the detriment of the BCR and its municipalities. To balance their 
budgets, the latter had to resort to heavier taxation or offer fewer public services. 
This triggered a vicious circle: by contributing to the affluent taxpayers’ exodus to 
the city’s outskirts, this situation has worsened the financial situations of Brussels’ 
municipalities even more. 
4. Governance and the quality of public spending 
a. Political and institutional fragmentation that spawns malfunctioning?
Although this has been only partially quantified, we can surmise that the complexity 
of Brussels' institutional landscape, which is the result in part of various historical 
compromises, is the source of various forms of inefficiency that only worsen the 
BCR’s already poor finances. Problems arise because of the multiplicity of public 
authorities in Brussels and a fuzzy division of tasks and responsibilities. This can 
lead to duplication of effort or too low a level of provision of certain public services. 
The problem of the distribution of powers amongst Brussels’ public entities is also 
linked to the matter of the number of municipalities that the Region contains and 
how their boundaries were drawn. Smaller municipalities (or districts) would clearly 
have to manage things differently than the larger municipalities that have been cre-
ated through mergers of towns and villages.
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III. Policy options
1. Revenue, expenditures, balances, and indebtedness
a. Ensuring more stable and predictable regional revenues
To cope with revenue’s sensitivity to short-term economic developments, we rec-
ommend increasing the proportion that is less sensitive to such conditions (e.g., 
income linked to consumption, to the environment, etc.) and reducing the propor-
tion that concerns flows (registration fees on property transfer) to concentrate on 
income linked to a stock (such as the real estate tax).
Linking revenue to the Region's economic wealth, which is rising steadily, rather to 
the relative prosperity of its inhabitants, which has been declining steadily for the 
past decade, should also be sought. Seen from this angle, assigning part of the 
personal income tax at the source would be an interesting avenue to explore.
b. Ensuring the municipalities’ autonomy and financial accountability
Increasing municipal financing via regional grants can ensure a minimum of consis-
tency between the two levels of governments’ policies, at least in theory. On the 
other hand, a system that relies heavily and increasingly on grants reduces the mu-
nicipalities’ autonomy and responsibility.
Various developments could ensure the autonomy, responsibility, and solidarity of 
the BCR’s municipalities. These include an increase in the proportion of their own 
income in their total revenues, which could be achieved either by reducing the 
grants that they receive and increasing their fiscal room for manoeuvre or by trans-
ferring municipal spending powers to the Region without linking this to financial 
compensation. This could be accompanied by increasing the municipalities’ financial 
responsibility by limiting the ad hoc regional grants on an annual basis.
c. Financing the Communities’ Commissions in line with their needs
To the extent that additional and increasing room for manoeuvre is given to the 
French-speaking Community, some of these means could very usefully benefit the 
COCOF in the form of a reduction in transfers to the French-speaking Community. 
In addition, a re-appraisal of the apportionment formula between the COCOF and 
VGC could be considered without challenging the legitimate support that is given to 
the Region's Dutch-speaking residents and taking account of the sources of financ-
ing that these institutions have, on the one hand, and the services that are provided 
to the population, on the other hand. The development of co-operation between the 
two commissions would also make it possible to pool certain means, make certain 
savings, and/or provide new services to the residents of Brussels.
2. Tax policy and market instruments
a. Rethinking regional and municipal tax policies
Given the growing negative externalities related to road transport and traffic in Brus-
sels, increasing the tax and non-tax burdens on this sector appears to be appropri-
ate. At the very least, the federal tax scheme should be neutral with regard to the 
choice of transport mode, that is, it appears to be less and less justifiable to provide 
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tax breaks for company cars. Concluding a co-operation agreement with the other 
Regions on taxes on automobile is a priority. A road toll system linked to congestion 
should be put to political debate based on the technical information that is now 
available.
The Region should have the power to oversee, co-ordinate, and even harmonise the 
various corporate taxes that exist at the municipal level [Aujean et al., 2005]. Failing 
this, we should suggest transferring the power to levy taxes in this area to the re-
gional level. The Region is effectively in a better position to take account of the ex-
ternalities that are linked to corporate taxes. In contrast, regionalising the federal 
corporate tax totally or in part does not appear to be justified, given the risks of fis-
cal competition and higher administrative and compliance costs.
To restore fairness when it comes to real estate taxes, a total or partial re-
assessment of real property values in the Region, or at last systematic re-appraisal 
of real estate’s value in the case of a transfer or succession, is a must.
Reducing the share of registration fees on property transfer in the revenue pie is 
advisable. This could be done by extending the targeted reductions in tax base and 
by guaranteeing the portability of rights. A transfer of the fiscal burden to the real 
estate tax may be justified in theory, but we stress the fact that this raises problems 
of transition.
b. Setting up a framework for action and co-ordination in the area of taxation
To ensure maximal co-ordination, consistency, and efficiency in the area of taxation, 
the regional authorities must be legally empowered to limit unilaterally the municipali-
ties’ powers to levy taxes. 
Increased fiscal co-ordination between the BCR and its constituent municipalities 
could also be facilitated by setting up an observatory on taxation and a co-
ordinating body that brings together the minister and deputy mayors in charge of 
finance. 
3. Intra- and extra-regional solidarity 
a. Ensuring a fair, effective, and transparent financing of the BCR and its municipali-
ties
In theory, several mechanisms would make it possible to better finance the 
Brussels-Capital Region and its municipalities. We recommend assigning part of the 
personal income tax to the Regions in line with the source of income. This would 
give the BCR a strong incentive to boost employment on its territory.
The quality of the transfer mechanisms could also be improved. By virtue of the 
subsidiarity principle, it does not appear to be justified to assign federal transfers to 
the municipalities. The Region is best able to organise the internal redistribution of 
monies across its territory. For the same reason, all the federal transfers should be 
concentrated on the regional level, including those of the Large Cities Policy.
The way BELIRIS is implemented must be completely revamped in order notably to 
increase the transparency and democratic legitimacy of the decisions that are taken 
therein and to carry out the projects faster. One option would be to transfer the con-
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tracting authority for BELIRIS to the Brussels-Capital Region. Another would be to 
re-examine the rules on the federal level.
b. Encouraging European financing for the capital of Europe
Finally, we may wonder about the role that the European budget could play. Financ-
ing to promote the capital of Europe could be justified on a number of grounds [Van 
Wynsberghe, 2006]. In the context of the preparation of the EU’s post-2013 multi-
annual financial framework, care should be taken to ensure that Brussels and Bel-
gium adopt consistent strategies. This means developing and implementing quickly 
a strategy to pitch Brussels’ interests to the European institutions [Hubert, 2008]. 
c. Examining the possibilities created by an Urban Community or co-operation 
agreements
A partial solution to the problem of Brussels’ under-financing could be the creation 
of an Urban Community extending beyond the Region's nineteen municipalities for 
the purpose of organising – and financing – jointly a certain number of collective 
goods and services, especially public transport. Given the prospect of the inevitable 
loss of some of the Brussels Capital Region's autonomy, some people propose 
resorting to a reversible co-operation agreement and giving each participating Re-
gion the right to veto all or part of the decisions taken under such an agreement. An 
alternative would be to establish one-off co-operation agreements, as needed.
4. Governance, assessment, and quality of public spending
a. Re-examining the division of powers and responsibilities between the regional 
and municipal governments
The need for a systematic review of the way the organisation of tasks is distributed 
amongst Brussels’ entities is regularly brought up [Cattoir et de Callataÿ, 2007]. This 
need not necessarily be done to the detriment of the local governments. The pro-
posal is to examine in particular the distribution of tasks in areas where major spill-
over effects can occur, for example, in the secondary schools, hospitals, museums, 
and so on. 
In parallel, other avenues also deserve consideration. These include redrawing the 
municipalities, which are highly disparate in size and sometimes have surrealistic 
boundaries, and having the BCR manage certain areas of regional interest, such as 
the Heysel trade fair and convention centre complex and the Bois de la Cambre/
Kamerbos woodland park.
b. Increasing the transparency of public policies and fostering a culture of assess-
ment
Given the financial straitjacket within which it works and the segmentation of the 
bodies that carry out the Region's actions, the BCR can no longer do without set-
ting up a public policy assessment policy. Certain swathes of its action depend 
lastingly – and thus without democratic alternation – on the same parties or political 
leaders. Corollaries are real risks of a lack of transparency, a lack of oversight, and 
an inability to set new priorities. The development of a culture of independent policy 
assessment could help to open up discussion in this regard. This culture should be 
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founded upon clear principles: independence of the assessors, expertise, transpar-
ency, pluralism, etc.
On another level, the readability of the public operators’ achievements and the lat-
ter’s cost are not guaranteed by any official mechanism for the recurrent generation 
of information. Now, this is vital for political arbitration and high-quality democratic 
debate. We propose that an institution should be set up quickly in Brussels to col-
lect and process statistics, assess the Region's public policies, and produce the 
necessary information for this (or else an existing institution should be reformed to 
carry out these tasks).
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